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1957] RECENT CASES
RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES - OPERATOR'S LICENSE - APPEAL FROM COMMISSIONER'S
ORDER. - The State Highway Commissioner ordered suspension of the license
of a driver for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor. The trial court modified the suspension by reducing it from sixty to
thirty days. The highway commissioner then instituted this appeal contending
that although the trial court may, under statutory authority, determine
%%hether the license should or should not be suspended, it has no discre-
tion to determine the length of suspension. The Supreme Court of North
Dakota, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the decision of the trial court and
held that the hearing before the trial court was a trial de novo of the case, and
that the court had discretion to determine how long the license should be sus-
pended, the length of suspension being but an incident of the power to sus-
rend which the court already had. Conway v. Thompson, 78 N.W.2d 400 (N.
D. 1956).
Operating a motor vehicle is a privilege subject to state control,' and a
license to drive once issued remains subject to suspension or revocation. 2
However, a license to drive cannot be taken from a licensee arbitrarily or
capriciously,' but only in the manner and on the grounds provided by law.
4
The legislature has full authority to designate the agency through which a
license will be suspended or revoked. 5 In North Dakota this power has been
delegated to the State Highway Commissioner by statute., Other courts
have held statutes of similar import not invalid as a delegation of judicial
authority to an executive officer.' However, such delegation may be invalid if
the legislature should fail to establish standards to control the administrator's
discretion.8 The authorized agency has the sole power to revoke or suspend
the operator's license;9 and unless ;authorized by statute the courts cannot
exercise such power.1"
In North Dakota the Commissioner is authorzied to suspend the licenes of
an operator without a preliminary hearing upon a showing by records or other
sufficient evidence that the licensee has committed certain offenses." Statutes
1. See e. g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 278 Ky. 218, 128 S.W.2d 579 (1939).
2. See e. g., Thompson v. Thompson, 78 K.W.2d 395 (N. D. 1956).
3. Wall v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 3'-9 Mass. 70, 106 N.E.2d 425, 427 (1952)
(dictum); South Carolina State Highway Degartment v. Harbin, 226 S. C. 585, 86
S.E.2d 466, 470 (1955) (dictum); Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579,
583 (1930) (dictum).
4. Carnegie v. Department of Public Safety, 60 So.2d 728, 730 (Fla. 1952) (dictum);
Sleeper v. Woodmansee, 11 Cal. App.2d 595, 54 P.2d 519, 521 (1930) (dictum).
5. State v. McDaniels, 219 N. C. 763, 14 S.1,.2d 793 (1941).
6. See N. D. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 251, Hi 30, 31.
7. See Keck v. Supe rior Court, 109 Cal. App. 251, 293 Pac. 128 (1930); State v.
Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514 (1953).
8. See Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930).
9. See State v. Cole, 241 N. C. 576, 86 S.E.2d iz03 (1955); State v. McDaniels, 219
N. C. 763, 14 S.E.2d 793 (1941); Ashcraft v. State, 6t Okla. Cr. 308, 98 P.2d 60 (1940);
Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 403, 17 S.E.2d 393 (11,41) (Suspension or revocation of
driver's license is civil and not criminal in nature.)
10. See State v. Warren, 230 N. C. 299, 52 S.E.2d t79 (1949); See note 9 supra.
11. N. D. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 251, § 31. (The enimerated offenses include driving
while under influence of liquor or drugs, permitting unlavful or fraudulent use of license;
incompetency to drive a motor vehicle; habitual recklessness or negligence; conviction of
serious offenses against traffic regulations with such freqtency as to indicate a disrespect
for traffic laws and a disregard for safety of other persos, and commission of an offense
fer which mandatory revocation of license is required upor- conviction.) See N. D. Sess.
Laws 1955, c. 251, § 30 regarding provisions for mandatory revocation. See N. D. Sess.
Laws 1955, c. 251 §34 for statutory limits as to length of suspension.
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;.tithorizing suspension of a license without a hearing have been sustained
nagainst constitutional objection where they give the licensee a right to a trial
de novo on appeal from such suspension. 12 The North Dakota legislature has
provided the licensee with an opportunity for a hearing before the commis-
sioner following suspension, and "upon such hearing the commissioner may
either rescind his order of suspension or, good cause appearing therefor, may
cintinue, modify, or extend the suspension of such license or revoke such
license."'1 Thereafter, the licensee has the right of appeal to the courts to
... examine into the facts of the case and to determine whether the peti-
toner is entitled to a license or is subject to suspension, cancellation, or revo-
cation of license . . ."14 The instant case indicates that the hearing before
the court takes the form of a trial de novo of the case. 15
The problem presented by the instant case is one of "separation of powers".
Authority to suspend the license was validly delegated to the Commissioner
and not to the courts." ; The provision for trial de novo in the district court
is not a criminal proceeding in which case the court would have discretion
itn imposing sentence.'T Thus it is arguable that the hearing on appeal should
he concerned with whether the Commissioner's order has been reasonable and
not an abuse of the discretion vested in him by the legislature's For the
court to modify the Commissioner's order as to length of suspension where
slibstantial grounds for suspension exist and there has been no abuse of discre-
tion is in effect to exercise his discretion for him, thereby nullifying the legis-
lative delegation of authority.
CECIL E. REINKE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDER - SUIIARY Dis-
MISSAL OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. - Petitioner, an inspector for the Food
and Drug Administration, was summarily dismissed from his employment under
-,uthority of Public Law 7831 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") as extended
Ly Executive Order 10450, April, 1953.2 Petitioner's appeal to the Civil Ser-
vice Commission under authority of the Veteran's Preference Act 3 was de-
clined. Petitioner then filed a complaint in the federal district court and
12. See Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A.2d 408 (1939).
13. N. D. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 251, § 52.
14. N. D. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 251, § 38.
15. Cf. In re Wright, 228 N. C. 301, 45 S.E.2d 370 (1947). clarified on rehearing
228 N. C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696 (1948); Commonwealth v. Herzog, 359 Pa. 641, 60 A.2d
37 (1948).
16. See note 11, supra.
17. See Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 403, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941) (Suspension or re-
vocation of drivers license is civil and not criminal in nature.)
18. See in re Wright, 228 N. C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696, 700 (1948) (dictum) ("It must
be noted, however, that the discretion to suspend or revoke, or not to suspend or revoke, is
vested in the department, subject te a judicial review of the facts upon which its action
is based. No discretionary power is conferred upon the Superior Court. Hence, if the
judge, upon the hearing, finds and concludes that the license of the petitioner is in fact
subject to suspension or revocatiau under the provisions of the statute, the order of the
department entered in conformity with the facts found must be affirmed.")
1. 64 Stat. 476 (1950), 5 U. S. C. §§ 22-1. 22-3 (Supp. 1952).
2. Exec. Order No. 10405, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953) (The Order extends the Act
to all government employees :.nd supplies a negative test which is more stringent than
that prescribed by the Act, i. e., the Order uses "clearly consistent with the interests of
national security" as the test; the Act uses "in the best interest of national security" as
the test. )
3. 58 Stat. 387, 5 U.S.C. 851-69 (1944), as amended; 66 Stat. 626, 5 U.S.C.
§ 851-69 (Cum. Supp. 1956).
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